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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Gelco court cited, as additional authority, an old Court of Appeals
decision which held that in an action for breach of a contract to borrow
money and repay at a specified rate of interest, the contract rate governs
until either the principal is paid or the contract is merged into a judg-
ment; thereafter, the "legal rate" would control.131
The most recent development in this controversy is Belcher v.
Kesten,3 2 wherein the Supreme Court, Queens County, further clari-
fied its earlier position13 3 in holding that 6 percent is the legal rate of
interest to be applied to a negligence judgment resulting from wrong-
ful death. Justice Clark ruled that the Banking Board's actions, and
hence the higher rate, were only applicable to commercial transactions
The deleterious effects of this unsettled state of the law will con-
tinue to be felt until some affirmative legislative steps are taken. Where
a choice of venue is possible, "forum shopping" will be encouraged
as litigants seek out "7.5 percent forums." It is hoped that the legisla-
ture will act as soon as possible to declare a uniform interest rate on
money judgments or, as suggested in Belcher, to set one standard for
judgments arising out of tortious acts and another for those arising
out of commercial transactions, in an attempt to achieve parity with
commercial interest rates. But if legislative action is not forthcoming,
it is submitted that the appellate courts should seize upon the first op-
portunity and set the controlling interest themselves.
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Seider action dismissed in federal court because absence of
"genuine" New York plaintiff eliminated a "debt" present in New
York.
In Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,134 a federal court of appeals
availed itself of the opportunity to limit the applicability of Seider v.
Roth'35 in actions instituted in the United States courts. In Farrell the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order 36 to vacate attachments
of defendants' liability insurance policies and dismiss thirteen suits
arising out of an airplane crash in North Carolina. The nominal
131 O'Brien v. Young, 95 N.Y. 428 (1884). See also Ferris v. Hard, 135 N.Y. 354, 32
N.E. 129 (1892).
132 162 N.Y.L.J. 20, July 29, 1969, at 11, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Queens County).
133 See Jamaica Say. Bank v. Giacomantonio, 59 Misc. 2d 704, 300 N.YS.2d 218
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
134 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1969).
135 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See generally 7B MCKiNNEY'S
CPLR 5201, supp. commentaries 15-53 (1964-68). See also Note, Seider v. Roth: The Con-
stitutional Phase, 43 ST. JoHN'S L. R~v. 58 (1968) for a discussion of the Seider v. Roth
doctrine and some of the problems it evokes.
136 295 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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plaintiffs in this action were New York domiciliaries who had been ap-
pointed as administrators of the estates of the thirteen decedents, who
had resided without the state. Moreover, all those who would stand
to benefit from any wrongful death recovery were non-residents. Two
defendants, Piedmont Aviation, Inc., and The Boeing Company, were
foreign corporations subject to in personam jurisdiction in New York,
while two others, Rapidair, Inc., and Lanseair, Inc., were Missouri
corporations, not subject to in personam jurisdiction in this state.
Federal jurisdiction was based upon the diversity of citizenship be-
tween the administrators and the corporate defendants. 3 7
The plaintiffs sought to acquire jurisdiction in New York over
Lanseair and Rapidair by utilizing the Seider doctrine, i.e., by attach-
ing the liability insurance policies issued to these companies by insur-
ance carriers doing business in New York. Although the defendants
were subject to in personam jurisdiction in North Carolina, a Seider
attachment in New York would most likely result in a greater re-
covery.138
Both the district and circuit courts were convinced that litigation
such as this, not involving a "true" New York plaintiff, should be dis-
missed. The federal courts presumably believed that the New York
courts would dismiss such an action on the basis of forum non con-
veniens;130 and following the guidance of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,140
the federal court should likewise dismiss. However, the federal courts
avoided conveniens principles and relied upon another ground for the
dismissal.
The Second Circuit theorized that the New York Court of Appeals,
had it been faced with a similar situation, would have held that the
obligations to defend and indemnify the insured would not constitute
a "debt" present in New York, and, therefore, would not be attachable.
The court reasoned:
In truth the defendants own nothing in New York or at least
nothing that they do not "own" to the same extent in every state;
their insurers are bound to defend and indemnify them wherever
137 See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
138 Juries in New York are generally recognized to arrive at higher verdicts in per-
sonal injury cases than in other areas of the country. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
305, 316, 234 N.E.2d 669, 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1967) (concurring opinion of Breitel,
J.).
139 The New York view on forum non conveniens is that courts of this state will only
accept jurisdiction in a case involving two non-residents where the cause of action arose
without the state upon a showing of special circumstances. Farrell was devoid of such cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't
1968); Williams v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 9 App. Div. 2d 268, 193 N.YS.2d 588 (1st Dep't
1959). See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 341-42 (1968).
140 304 US. 64 (1938).
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they are sued, even in a state where the insurers are not doing
business. Under such circumstances, where there are absolutely no
New York contacts except for the doing of business by the insurers,
we have the gravest difficulty in understanding how New York could
constitutionally call upon the insureds to respond or could impair
by attachment rights the insurers would otherwise have to settle
with other claimants.1 1
The federal courts opined that the New York Court of Appeals would
construe a liability insurance policy to be a "debt" only when the
plaintiff was a New York resident or was suing upon an accident which
occurred in New York. 142 As suggested previously, however, such an
interpretation by the New York courts would appear unlikely in light
of New York's willingness to apply modified conveniens rules to achieve
the same result, i.e., dismissal.
Although the same result would have been achieved in a New
York court, it seems that the federal courts acted in a circuitous
fashion. Nevertheless, the decision makes it apparent that both the
federal and New York courts recognize that Seider aims to give a
"genuine" New York plaintiff a New York forum instead of permitting
cases arising in all parts of the nation to be triable in New York merely
because a defendant has the remotest of connections with the state.
CPLR 5231(b): Income execution available against non-resident
judgment debtor.
CPLR 5231(b) requires that an income execution be initially
delivered to the sheriff of the county in which the judgment debtor
resides, or if he is a non-resident, the sheriff in the county in which he
works. Since the sheriff must personally serve him with a copy of the
income execution,1 43 the debtor is thereby given the opportunity to
satisfy the outstanding judgment before his employer is served. This
subdivision would appear to afford immunity to a debtor who neither
resides in nor is physically employed within the state, even though the
judgment is rendered, and the garnishee-employer is present, in New
York.144
141411 F.2d at 816.
142 Id. at 817:
A court that could perform the "miracle" on CPLR 320(c) that was effected in
the opinion denying reargument in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) . . . would scarcely shrink from the easier task of saying
that a liability insurance policy was a "debt" only when the plaintiff was a residentor w s suing for a New York accident. This would be particularly true if the
Court of Appeals considered that such a restrictive construction was needed to
save Seider from unconstitutionality or even from serious constitutional doubt.
143 CPLR 5231(c).
144 See, e.g., Brown v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 53 Misc. 2d 182, 278 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup.
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